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OWEN v. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE:
THE DEMISE OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
Traditionally, courts have granted municipalities absolute immu-
nity for their governmental and discretionary actions.1 Civil liability
in tort attached only for a municipality's proprietary and ministerial
acts. 2 Recently, some lower federal courts have accorded municipali-
1. Common law municipal immunity originated in Russell v. Men of Devon, 2
Term. Rptr. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) (town immune because unincorporated
and no funds from which to pay claims). See Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liabil-
ityin Operation, 54 HARv. L. REV. 437, 438 (1941). Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247
(1812), incorporated the immunity doctrine into American common law. The court in
Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842), first distinguished between governmental
and proprietary (or corporate) actions, imposing liability only for the latter. See gen-
erally J. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 708-19
(1872); C. ELLIOT, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, ch. 16
(1898); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.02b-.59 (3d
ed. 1977); C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW, 730-38 (1957); T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, ch. 8 (2d ed. 1870); James, Tort Liability of
Governmental Units and their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610, 622 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as James]. Courts also immunized municipalities from liability for exercises of
discretion. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers-Damage Rem-
edies, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218-25 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe]. Thus, for a
time, the common law accorded municipalities absolute immunity from tort liability.
Later, some courts immunized municipalities from liability for governmental acts.
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 720-21 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Mhe state courts did not speak with a single voice with
regard to the tort immunity of municipal corporations."); Sala v. County of Suffolk,
604 F.2d 207, 211 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, 978-79 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]; Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Kates & Kouba, Liability ofPub-
lic Entities Under Section 1983 Of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 142
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Kates & Kouba]; Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immu-
nity Doctrine in the United States 1790-1955, 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 795, 801.
2. Municipal liability developed in several areas. See generally K. DAVIS, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 25.07 (1956); E. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 29.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 970-87; Kates & Kouba, supra
note 1, at 143. Cities were routinely sued in tort in both federal and state courts. See
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 687-88 (1978);
cf. Cowles v. Mercer Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868) (state-created corporation
could be sued in federal court). Courts entertained constitutional violation suits
against cities, including suits brought under the Contract Clause. E.g., Benbow v.
Iowa City, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 313 (1869); Weber v. Lee County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 210
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ties a qualified "good faith" immunity3 for civil rights violations4
under § 1983, Sec. 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,1 as long as the
responsible municipal official acted in good faith. In Owen v. City of
Independence,6 the United States Supreme Court eliminated "good
faith" municipal immunity under § 1983, holding that a municipality
may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to
liability under § 1983.'
In Owen, by unanimous resolution of the city council, the City of
Independence publicly released an allegedly false statement im-
pugning the police chiefs honesty and integrity.8 The city manager
(1867); Board of Comm'rs v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376 (1860). See generally 6
C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECON-
STRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-68, chs. 17-18 (1971). Courts also heard actions
against municipalities for federal statutory violations. See, e.g., Levy Court v. Coro-
ner, 2 U.S. (2 Wall.) 501 (1864); Mayor of New York v. Ransom, 67 U.S. (23 How.)
487 (1859).
3. Since Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), discussed in notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra, federal courts have
tried to delineate the parameters of municipal immunity under § 1983. See notes 34-
43 and accompanying text infra.
4. Commentators term these violations "constitutional torts" because they violate
constitutional rights, common law tort duties, and statutorily protected rights. See
Shapo, Consditional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L.
REv. 277, 323-23 (1965).
5. Enacted by the Forty-Second Congress as Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)), the section today provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id See notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
6. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
7. Id. at 638.
8. At a regularly scheduled city council meeting, city councilman Roberts read
copies of confidential city counselor reports of police department property room "dis-
crepancies." Id. at 627. Roberts charged that Owen, the Chief of Police, had misap-
propriated police department property, allowed narcotics and money to disappear,
mysteriously allowed impounded firearms to reach the hands of felons, and manipu-
lated traffic tickets. Id. at 627 n.5, 628-29. Roberts moved that the council publicly
release the reports and give them to the county prosecutor for presentation to the
grand jury, and that the city manager take all appropriate action against those in-
volved. Id. at 629. The city council passed the resolu tion. Id. at 630. The grand
jury, however, returned a no true bill, and the reports were never publicly released.
.d. at 629.
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discharged the chief the next day.9 The council's accusations and the
chiefs discharge garnered extensive press coverage.'" Although the
accusations did not actually cause the discharge, the temporal se-
quence of events created an inference of causation in the eyes of the
public." The city twice refused the chiefs requests for written speci-
9. After hearing informal reports of "discrepancies" in police department prop-
erty room administration, city manager Alberg instituted an official investigation
through the city counselor's office. The confidential investigative reports stated that
no evidence warrated accusations of illegal or immoral activity. Id. at 625-26. Alberg
then unilaterally decided to discharge Owen. Four days before Owen's discharge,
Alberg issued a public statement in which he stated that no evidence supported alle-
gations of illegal activity, and that he had initiated administrative correction. Id. at
626. Alberg discharged Owen the day after the council's resolution without providing
reasons for his action, except that he acted pursuant to City of Independence Charter
§ 3.3(1), which gave the city manager authority to hire and fire department heads at
his discretion. Id. at 629.
10. Id. at 629 n.8.
11. The trial and appellate courts disagreed whether the city actually deprived
police chief Owen of his constitutionally protected liberty interest. Owen v. City of
Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 560
F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (for remand in light of Monell), on
remand. 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). The district court
found that the city did not deprive Owen of his liberty interest because the city's
allegedly stigmatizing actions did not directly cause Owen's discharge. 421 F. Supp.
at 1121-22. The court of appeals disagreed. It found that the city did violate Owen's
liberty interest because the city's allegedly false accusations blackened Owen's name
and reputation. While the stigmatizing charges were not included in the city man-
ager's official discharge notice, official city council action released the charges against
Owen contemporaneously which, in the eyes of the public, connected the charges with
Owen's dismissal. 560 F.2d at 937. While the court of appeals on remand and the
Supreme Court agreed with the district court's recital of the facts, both agreed with
the court of appeals' original factual interpretation.
The Supreme Court dissent agreed with the district court's original factual interpre-
tation. On the merits, the dissent emphasized that the city had no knowledge or no-
tice that its actions violated Owen's rights because the Supreme Court did not decide
that employees stigmatized in the course of discharge were entitled to a name clearing
hearing until two months after Owen's dismissal. Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 658-64 (1980). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Nelson, Har-
ding, Yeutter, Leonard, and Tate, Dischargefrom Public Employment and the Right to
Procedural Due Process, 4 CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROB. 432 (1977).
For cases where fact patterns lacked constitutional violations, see, e.g., Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (no causal relation between injuries and actions of
defendants); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 642 (1977) (no stigma proved); Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (no hearing required after discharge of employee whose
position terminable at will of employer); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (no con-
stitutional violation in course of termination of employment); Rizzo v. Godde, 423
U.S. 362 (1976) (no causal link between alleged unconstitutional policy and alleged
constitutional violations); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (no proof
19811
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fication of the charges against him and an opportunity to clear his
name. 2 Because the city's actions allegedly blackened the chiefs
name and reputation, he sued the city for the deprivation of his four-
teenth amendment liberty interest without due process of law.' 3 The
Supreme Court held that the city was not immune from liability
under § 1983. In so holding, the Court advanced four rationales:
first, the statute's remedial nature protected those wronged by the
abuse of governmental authority;' 4 second, § 1983 on its face granted
no immunities; 5 third, denial of immunity would deter future civil
rights violations; 6 and lastly, public policy dictated that the munici-
pality, and not the victim, should bear the cost of civil rights
violations. 17
that defendant acted under custom or usage having force of law); Stringer v. City of
Chicago, 464 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. 111. 1979) (complaint stated no connection between
city and alleged misconduct). See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Back-
ground" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974); Note, Municipal Liability Under Sec-
tion 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom," 79 COLUM. L.R. 304 (1979).
12. Shortly after Alberg informed Owen of his dismissal, Owen requested specifi-
cation of the reasons and charges warranting his discharge, but Alberg ignored the
request. 445 U.S. at 629. The city and Alberg also denied Owen's subsequent request
for an appeal of the discharge decision, claiming that the city charter and ordinances
provided no appellate procedure for dismissals. Id.
13. As part of his action, Owen claimed a potential employer refused to hire him
because of the notoriety aroused by the circumstances of his discharge. 421 F. Supp.
at 1117.
14. 445 U.S. at 650-51.
15. Id. at 635. Accord, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (By its
terms, § 1983 "creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no
immunities.").
16. 445 U.S. at 651-52.
17. Id. at 654-57. Public policy dictates that the entity which causes the loss
should bear the loss. Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 138. See generally Levinson,
Suing Political Subdivisions in Federal Court: From Edelman to Owen, 11 U. TOL. L.
REv. 829 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Levinson]. Because a governmental entity is
better able to pay the costs of maladministration than is an injured victim, Kates &
Kouba, supra note 1, at 136-38; Levinson, supra at 858, less compelling reasons exist
to protect the entity for acts characterized as official policy of that entity. See Note,
Monell v. Department of Social Services: The Emergence of Municipal Liability under
42 U.S.C § 1983, 8 CAP. U. L. REV. 103 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Monell: Emer-
gence]. Additionally, municipal corporations are better able to prepare for liaiblity
by planning and acquiring privately or publicly financed insurance coverage as a cost
of doing business. Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 143; Note, Local Governments Can
Be Sued Directly Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 where Unconstitutional Action is Pursuant to
Government Custom or Implements Offcial Policy, 10 Tax. TECH. L. REV. 145, 163-64
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Suits]. See note 38 and accompanying
text infra. See generally, K. DAVIS, supra note 2, at § 25.17 (Supp. 1970); W. PRos-
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At common law, courts granted municipalities immunity from civil
liability for their governmental or discretionary acts.'I Liability at-
tached only for proprietary or ministerial acts." To establish a fed-
eral cause of action for victims of civil rights deprivations, Congress
enacted section I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§ 1983).2o In pass-
ing § 1983, Congress sought to protect those Fourteenth Amendment
rights that states were unable to enforce or unwilling to uphold.2
While § 1983 does not expressly incorporate immunities, courts have
construed it to incorporate traditional common law immunities.22
Courts recognize four causes of action by which victims of civil
rights deprivations may obtain relief from municipalities. Three may
be brought under § 1983. First, the victim may sue the municipality
for damages.23 Second, the victim may sue the municipality for equi-
SER. supra note 1, at 970-987; Calibresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the
Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1967); Jaffe, supra note 1, at 213-18; Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "lust Compen-
sation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Developments in the Law-Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1218-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments--§ 1983 and Federalism].
18. See note 1 supra.
19. See note 2 supra.
20. See note 5 supra. The Forty-Second Congress passed section one with little
debate, leaving no direct legislative history about the scope of liability or immunity
under § 1983. Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 132-33; Developments- 1983 and
Federalism, supra note 17, at 1192; Comment, Municipal Liability andSection 1983for
Civil Rights Violations after Monell, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1032 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Liability after Monell]. See generally, Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Liability
Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Levin]; Levinson, supra note
17, at 855 & n.19; Shapo, supra note 4.
21. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1871, popularly called the Ku Klux
Klan Act, to protect blacks in the South from violence which violated their civil rights
under the newly-enacted Fourteenth Amendment. Two purposes of the Act were to
provide compensation to victims of past abuses, and to deter future constitutional
deprivations. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. at 651. See Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
22. "The Supreme Court has read § 1983 as incorporating common law immuni-
ties when it finds that the same considerations of public policy that underlie the com-
mon law rule likewise countenance immunity under § 1983." Bertot v. School Dist.
No. 1, Albany County, 613 F.2d 245, 248 (10th Cir. 1979); accord Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976) ("[Slection 1983 is to be read in harmony with
general principles of tort immunities and defenses. . ."). See generally, Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). See
also Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation after MonelU, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 247
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Schnapper].
23. See notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
1981]
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table relief.24 Third, the victim may recover indirectly from the mu-
nicipality by suing the municipal official or agent, who, acting within
an official capacity, was responsible for the civil rights deprivation. If
an indemnity contract exists, the municipality may indemnify the of-
ficial or agent for payment of the judgment.25  Lastly, ignoring
24. See Diamond v. Pitches, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969) (action by prison inmate
for damages and injunction against state, county, sheriff, and male nurse); Deane Hill
Country Club, Inc. v. Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321, 323-24 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 975(1967) (action to enjoin enforcement of annexation ordinance, and to recover
from city amount of taxes exacted on annexed property); Patton v. Bennett, 304 F.
Supp. 297, 299 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (action by student against teacher, board of educa-
tion, and member of board to enjoin violation of civil rights). But see, e.g., Harkless
v. Sweeney Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970) (action to enjoin
school district to renew contracts and receive backpay for alleged racial discrimina-
tion); Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961) (action to enjoin
enforcement of alleged discriminatory regulation of charitable solicitations).
The Supreme Court rejected § 1983 injunctive relief against municipalities by ex-
tending the Monroe non-person rule, see notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra,
which eliminated municipalities from damage liability under § 1983. City of Keno-
sha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973) (§ 1983 cannot support action for injunction against
a city). Cf. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973) (§ 1983 cannot be the
basis of a damage action against a county which could be held liable under state law).
See generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 147; Levin, supra note 20, at 1494-
1504; Levinson, supra note 17, at 859; Note, Damage Remedies Against Munlcioalltles
for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 925 & n.22 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Damage Remedies]; Developments- 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17, at
1193; Liabili Afier Monell, supra note 20, at 1037.
25. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1976); Burt v. Board of
Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1954); Incarcerated Men of Allen County v. Fair,
507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 447 F. Supp. 229 (E.D.
Pa. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1978). Contra, Paxman v.
Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 528 F.2d
499 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc). See also, Newman, Suing the Law Breakers: Proposal
to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87
YALE L.L 447, 462-63 (1978) (suggesting municipal liability for erroneous constitu-
tional decisions by judges).
An official is personally responsible, however, for suits against him/her in an indi-
vidual capacity. Courts sought to protect officials from such liability by according
various immunities. Courts granted absolute immunity to several higher governmen-
tal officials sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities. E.g., Stump v. Spark-
man, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judges absolutely immune when acting within jurisdiction);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors absolutely immune in initiating
and presenting state's case); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges absolutely
immune when acting within their jurisdictions); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (legislator's statement privileged in legislative proceedings). In some cases the
Court accorded officials qualified "good faith" immunity. See Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978) (qualified immunity for federal official even outside scope of
authority); Procunier v. Naverette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (qualified immunity for prison
officials for negligent conduct); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (quali-
[Vol. 21:241
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§ 1983, the victim may sue the municipality in an action for damages
brought directly under the Constitution.26
In Monroe v. Pape,2 7 the Supreme Court narrowed the applicabil-
ity of the § 1983 damage action by excluding municipalities as de-
fendants in such actions. Believing that Congress intended § 1983 to
apply only to natural persons,2" the Monroe court held that munici-
palities, as artificial entities, were absolutely immune from § 1983
damage actions.29
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, the
Supreme Court overruled Monroe's absolute municipal immunity
holding.30 The Monell court broadened the applicability of § 1983
by construing congressional intent to include municipalities as per-
sons for purposes of § 1983. This interpretation exposed municipali-
ties to lawsuits under § 1983.11 The Monell court eliminated absolute
municipal immunity, but refused to determine which specific munici-
pal immunities remained under § 1983.32
While the Monell court broadened the § 1983 cause of action by
limiting municipal immunity, it left to the lower federal courts the
fled immunity for state hospital superintendent acting pursuant to state law); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (qualified immunity for school board officials enforc-
ing school policy in good faith); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (state execu-
tive has qualified immunity when acting within scope of duties, within discretion of
office, with good faith). See generally Freed, Executive Official Immunityfor Constitu-
tional Violations: An Analysts and a Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 526, 528-29, 539
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Freed]; James, supra note I; Levinson, supra note 17, at
857-63.
26. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Hostrop v.
Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 963 (1976); Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 522 F.2d 204,205 (5th Cir.
1975); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975).
27. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). "Monroe v. Pape resurrected section 1983 from ninety
years of obscurity." Developments- 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17, at 1169.
28. See generally, Kates & Kouba, supra note I, at 133-35 (discussing Monroe
court finding that House rejection of Dictionary Act definition of "person" and rejec-
tion of Sherman Amendment inferred House hostility to municipal immunity); Devel-
opment--§ 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17, at 1191.
29. 365 U.S. at 187-92.
30. 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). See generally Note, Liability of State and Local Gov-
ernments Under 42 U.S. C. 1983, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 311, 322 & n.63 (1978) (discus-
sing reversal based on common law and policy factors rather than on legislative
history of § 1983) [hereinafter cited as State and Local Liability].
31. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
32. Id. at 695, 701.
1981]
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task of determining the contours of that immunity."3 Two views of
municipal immunity under § 1983 emerged. Under the first view,
courts carried the Monell expansion of municipal liability to its natu-
ral conclusion by eliminating municipal immunity in § 1983 ac-
tions.34 These courts have concluded the following: first, that
municipalities may be liable under § 1983 to compensate victims of
constitutional deprivations;35 second, that municipal liability would
deter officials from violating constitutional rights; 36 third, that victims
should not bear the burden of constitutional violations; 37 and lastly,
that municipal liability best spreads the cost of constitutional depri-
vations to the public at large.38
33. Id. at 695 ("[We expressly leave further development of this action [sketching
the contours of municipal liability/immunity] to another day.").
34. See, e.g., Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, Albany County, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir.
1979) (en banc) (no qualified immunity for school district) ("The spirit of Monell is
more compatible with an expansion than a contraction of liability."); Hander v. San
Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975) (local school district has no Elev-
enth Amendment immunity); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523
F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975) (where established policy attacked, municipal good faith im-
munity inapplicable); Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (no qualified immunity for ad hoe execution of policy).
35. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Kates & Kouba,
supra note 1, at 136-37; Schnapper, supra note 22, at 241-44; Liabilit after Monell,
supra note 20, at 1056; Local Government Suits, supra note 17, at 164.
36. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,590-91 (1978); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978). Courts believing that municipal liability deters constitutional
violations usually opine that municipal liability does not cause undue timidity in offi-
cials' exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, Albany County,
613 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1979); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977)
(dictum) (Coffin, C.J.); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 798, 447 P.2d 352, 363, 73
Cal. Rptr. 240, 251 (1968). See generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 140-41;
Levinson, supra note 17, at 861 & n.190; Schnapper, supra note 22, at 244-45; Smith,
Municipal Tort Liability, 48 MICH. L. REV. 41, 50-51 (1949); Comment, New Damage
Remediesfor Violations of Constitutional Rights, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 67, 75 (1979);
Liability after Monell, supra note 20, at 1056. See also Damage Remedies, supra note
24, at 957.
37. See Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 870-72 (4th Cir. 1980) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (on balance, the municipality and not the
victim should bear the burden); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977) (pub-
lic policy dictates that victims of unconstitutional municipal conduct should be com-
pensated). See generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 143; Liability After Monell,
supra note 20, at 1056; Monell: Emergence, supra note 17, at 126-27.
38. See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (municipal liability
spreads cost most effectively; city in best position to correct unconstitutional policies).
See note 17 and accompanying text supra. See generally Levinson, supra note 17, at
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In contrast, under the second view, courts retained a limited form
of municipal immunity. These courts fashioned a qualified "good
faith" municipal immunity, similar to the one accorded government
officials when sued under § 1983 in their individual capacities.3 9
These courts supported qualified municipal immunity on the grounds
that courts should defer to municipalities' governmental and discre-
tionary actions.4° These courts reasoned that municipal liability
should attach only when the municipality violated constitutional
rights knowingly or with notice.41 The underpinnings of this view
862; Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L. F.
919, 970-7 1; State and Local Liability, supra note 30, at 322-23 Monell: Emergence,
supra note 17, at 127-28.
39. See, e.g., Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Sala v.
County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (Ist
Cir. 1977); Devasto v. Faherty, 479 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1979); Gross v.
Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Md. 1979); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F.
Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585 (D. R.I. 1978).
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at § 131; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
2, at § 29.1-.17.
40. Judicial deference to executive discretionary decisions is rooted in the princi-
ple of separation of powers. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803);
Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 794 n.8, 447 P.2d 352, 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 249
n.8 (1968) (en banc) ("Immunity for 'discretionary' activities serves no purpose except
to assure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of
coordinate branches of government."). Contra, Garner v. Giarrusso 571 F.2d 1330,
1341 (5th Cir. 1978) (no unjust penalty against exercise of discretion). See generally
Monell: Emergence, supra note 17, at 122-25.
41. It is not a tort for government to govern. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 57 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Accord Schurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 241
(1974) (quoting Dalehite with approval); see Sala v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207,
211 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Where prior law does not suggest that a municipal policy is
constitutionally infirm, it cannot be said in any meaningful sense that the municipal-
ity has been 'at fault' in adopting that policy, and we do not believe that § 1983,
enacted by a Congress accustomed to a nearly absolute immunity, should be read to
implement a doctrine of liability without fault.") (Footnotes omitted.)
Some courts determined that Congress never intended to make municipalities
strictly liable in tort suits. See, e.g., Gross v. Pomerleau, 465 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Md.
1979) (Monell did not reject municipal good faith immunity); Ohland v. City of
Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979) (the reasons for strict government liability
are weaker than those for vicarious liability which the court rejected).
Some courts suggested liability applied only prospectively, so that municipalities
need not predict the future course of constitutional law. E.g., Sala v. County of Suf-
folk, 604 F.2d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 1979); see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
105-07 (1971) (prospective application of new legal principle). See generally Freed,
supra note 25, at 529; Schnapper, supra note 22, at 248. Liability after Monell, supra
note 20, at 1055. See also Cox v. Cooke, 420 U.S. 734, 736 (1975) (per curiam) (pro-
spective application of new legal principle, especially where no one person was re-
sponsible for formulating the policy).
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are that municipal liability inhibits government action because it in-
hibits municipal officials and agents from acting forcefully for fear of
violating constitutionally protected rights,4 2 and that municipalities
cannot afford the financial burden of § 1983 judgements.43
In Owen, the Supreme Court44 adopted the absolute municipal lia-
bility to which it had adverted in Monell, and rejected qualified
"good faith" immunity. Holding that a municipality may not assert
the good faith of its officers or agents as a defense to liability,4 5 the
Owen court eliminated any municipal immunity in § 1983 actions.
The Court found § 1983's language broad in its scope of liability and
absolute in its cause of action.4 6 The Court found neither a tradition
of common law municipal immunity nor any policy that justified a
qualified immunity.47
The Owen court imposed liability in spite of immunities tradition-
42. See, e.g., Devasto v. Faherty, 479 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1979) (accorded
municipal good faith immunity because threat of liability would deter officials' execu-
tion of duties). Some judges suggested a municipal immunity stricter than the one for
officials in their individual capacities because broad municipal liability might deter
energetic and decisive decision-making. Eg., Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 863
(4th Cir. 1980) (Haynesworth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (officials
in their official capacities should have immunity if they acted in good faith and rea-
sonably in the performance of their tasks); id. at 878-79 (Phillips, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (grant municipal good faith immunity if individual de-
fendants acted with reasonable care, because the Forty-Second Congress believed in
absolute municipal immunity, and never would have adopted absolute municipal lia-
bility). See generally Freed, supra note 25, at 529; Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at
143; Liability after Monell, supra note 20, at 1055; Local Government Suits, supra note
17, at 164. See also Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 1977) (government
bodies should have a narrower immunity than individual officials because social pol-
icy warrants the compensation of victims of unconstitutional conduct); Leite v.City of
Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585 (D. R.I. 1978) (good faith municipal immunity accorded
if conduct is non-malicious and in absence of a clearly established right which the
government had no reason to know was being infringed.").
43. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 860 (4th Cir. 1980); Devasto v. Faherty, 479
F. Sup. 1069 (D. Mass. 1979); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324,345 (D.
Vt. 1979) (taxpayers are not investors in government units; such units cannot choose
to avoid areas of decision-making susceptible to the risks of constitutional violations).
See generally Liability after Monell, supra note 20, at 1056.
44. The Court split 5-4. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall,
Stevens, and White, wrote for the majority, as he had in Monell. Justice Powell wrote
for the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist.
45. 445 U.S. at 638.
46. Id. at 635-37.
47. Id. at 638.
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ally accorded municipal governmental and discretionary actions.4
The Court rejected governmental action immunity, reasoning that a
sovereign may by statute consent to be sued for its governmental im-
proprieties; the Court viewed § 1983 as such a statute.49 The Court
discarded discretionary immunity on the grounds that a municipality
has no discretion to violate the Constitution."
The Owen court distinguished the effects of an official's individual
liability from the effects of municipal liability.5 Fearing that the
threat of personal liability would deter authoritative decision-mak-
ing,52 the Court determined that municipal officials should be person-
ally immune for civil rights violations.53 The Court asserted that the
common law individual immunity accorded government officials act-
ing within the scope of their duties removed this threat. 4 In contrast,
the Court believed that municipal liability would not deter forceful
official action. 5 To the contrary, the Court stressed that imposition
of municipal liability would promote protection of civil rights. The
court concluded that decision-making officials whose actions might
infringe upon civil rights would act to protect such rights in order to
save their municipalities' fiscs from potential § 1983 judgments.5 6
The Owen court posited three policies to support its holding that
municipalities could not assert any immunity defense in § 1983 ac-
tions. First, since Congress intended § 1983 to remedy civil rights
deprivations, courts should not permit a public entity to deny liability
for injury it caused.57 Next, the Court suggested that compensatory
judgments against municipalities would deter future constitutional
deprivations because officials would circumscribe their actions within
48. Id. at 644-50. For a discussion of how the Court shifted its reading of § 1983
from interpretation of the statute to reliance on policy, see generally Liability after
Monell, supra note 20, at 1036; Damage Remedies, supra note 24, at 939.
49. 445 U.S. at 644-48. See generally James, supra note 1, at 615.
50. 445 U.S. at 648-50.
51. Id. at 652-56. ,4ccord, Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 681 (1978). See also, Bertot v. School Dist. No. I, Albany County, 613
F.2d 245, 248 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. 445 U.S. at 656 & n.40.
53. Id. at 637-38.
54. Id. at 656. Accord, Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 139.
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id. & n.41.
57. Id. at 651.
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constitutional limits to protect citizens' rights.58 Finally, the Court
argued that municipal liability, combined with developments in tort
law, would spread the cost of constitutional violations to the public at
large.59
The Owen dissent, written by Justice Powell, argued for qualified
"good faith" municipal immunity.6" Although the majority and dis-
sent agreed that some governmental officials should retain an abso-
lute or qualified immunity in § 1983 actions, they disagreed whether
municipalities should be accorded qualified immunity in § 1983
actions.
Powell, indicating weaknesses in the Court's reasoning, contended
that the Court erroneously construed congressional silence as abol-
ishing municipal immunity under § 1983.61 Powell asserted that the
language of § 1983 did not repeal common law traditions of immu-
nity.62 He claimed that the majority found support for congressional
acceptance of liability in general congressional statements supporting
§ 1983's remedial thrust.6 I Powell declared that the majority ignored
several congressmen's specftc statements that municipal liability
should attach only when a municipality acted in bad faith, or when
its officers had knowledge or notice that its actions violated constitu-
tional rights.'
The dissent posited four reasons why municipalities should retain
qualified "good faith" immunity. First, courts must defer to execu-
tive discretionary decisions.65 Second, imposition of retroactive lia-
bility on a municipality whose officers were unaware that their
conduct caused civil rights deprivations would punish the municipal-
ity and its officers for not anticipating the future course of constitu-
tional law.66 Third, municipal liability would paralyze government
58. Id. at 656.
59. Id. at 657-58. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
60. Id. at 658. (Powell, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 667, 675-76.
62. Id. at 665-67. See Imbler v. Pachtmen, 423 U.S. 409,421-24 (1976); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
63. 445 U.S. at 675. (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 671-75.
65. Id. at 667-68. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
66. Id. at 665. ("[S]trict municipal liability unreasonably subject local govern-
ments to damages judgments for actions that were reasonable when performed. It
converts municipal governance into a hazardous slalom through constitutional obsta-
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action." Finally, municipal liability would impose financial hard-
ship on the governmental units least able to bear the costs of adverse
judgments.'
Although the Owen majority and dissent posit various reasons for
municipal liability and immunity, their analyses fail to accord proper
weight to the arguments. Both majority and dissent rely, for exam-
ple, on § 1983's legislative history.6 9 Section 1983's language is silent
about possible immunities. 70 Congress passed § 1983 with little de-
bate, and said nothing about municipal immunity for constitutional
violations under § 1983.71 Because congressional intent regarding
§ 1983 immunity is inconclusive, analysis of the municipal immunity
issue should accord little weight to § 1983's legislative history.
The appropriate consideration properly addressed by both the ma-
jority and dissent is whether the traditions or policies in favor of mu-
nicipal immunity are justified in light of the burden that civil rights
violations impose on victims.72 The proper analytical question is:
Which party, the plaintiff/victim or the defendant/municipality,
though blameless, shall bear the burden of civil rights violations in
§ 1983 actions? In light of tort liability principles, which spread the
cost of liability to the public at large through centralized liability and
insurance,73 the majority's abolition of municipal immunity appears
justified.
"Systemic"" governmental civil rights violations, in which the
governmental entity injures people through no "fault" of the govern-
mental unit, warrant a reexamination of who should bear the burden
ties that often are unknown and unknowable.") See note 41 and accompanying text
supra.
67. 445 U.S. at 668-69. (Powell, J., dissenting.) Accord, Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Sheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974). See note 42 and
accompanying text supra.
68. 445 U.S. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting). See note 43 and accompanying text
supra.
69. 445 U.S. at 635passim; Id. at 644passirn (Powell, J., dissenting).
70. See note 5 supra.
71. See State and Local Lia'bility, supra note 30, at 322 & n.63 (no interpretive
guidance in legislative history of § 1983 regarding municipal immunity).
72. 445 U.S. at 635passbn; id. at 665passim (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. See note 17 supra.
74. "Systemic" injuries result from the combined actions of several governmental
units or officials, each of which may be acting in good faith. See 445 U.S. at 652. See
generally Developments-§ 1983 and Federalism, supra note 17, at 1218-19.
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and cost of constitutional deprivations. Common law justifications
for municipal immunity, created to protect municipalities from op-
pressive judgments when municipalities possessed few means of rais-
ing funds, no longer apply in the milieu of broadly-funded
governmental entities.75 Fairness dictates that pervasive governmen-
tal units, which increasingly impose themselves into the lives of citi-
zens, should bear and help spread the cost of individuals' civil rights
deprivations.76
After Owen's invocation of strict municipal liability in § 1983 ac-
tions, municipalities may attempt to prevent such actions by strictly
enforcing tightened municipal operating procedures.77 For those
§ 1983 suits which certainly will occur, municipalities may acquire
appropriate liability insurance.78
If the Owen court's supposition that municipal liability will pro-
mote protection of civil rights proves true, then the decision will
stand as a landmark in the history of civil rights. On the other hand,
Congress may wish to amend § 1983 if the imposition of municipal
liability paralyzes governmental action and renders municipalities
bankrupt, as Justice Powell feared in his dissent.79 Congress may re-
vise § 1983 by adopting the qualified "good faith" municipal immu-
nity which the court rejected in Owen, by including a negligence-
based tort standard for municipal liability,80 or by incorporating state
law immunities.8"
David R. Nachman
75. See 445 U.S. at 657. See generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 144;
Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No Wrong- 4 Comparative Study of the Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 AD. L.
REv. 39, 58 (1969); Monel: Emergence, supra note 17, at 126.
76. See note 17 supra.
77. See 445 U.S. at 652 and nn. 35 & 36; Schnapper, supra note 22, at 248-49.
78. See note 17 supra.
79. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 1, at 167; Liability after Monell, supra note 20,
at 1056 (legislative and not judicial function to correct problem); Damage Remedies,
supra note 24, at 927 & n.31.
80. See Jaffe, supra note 1, at 235-37; Nahmod, supra note 11, at 22; Schnapper,
supra note 22, at 247-50.
81. See 445 U.S. at 680-83 (Powell, J., dissenting); Kates & Kouba, supra note 1,
at 155-61.
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